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absent unless fail to collect them in time, then I am responsible for the fact that I miss the performance. What I had the opportunity to avoid this situation, even though I made no conscious decision. (Scanlon 2015, p. 108) Contractualist principles must be justified to each person. This justification must come some reason why a given principle makes sense to that person. In the Hazardous Waste case, contractualists argue that each person has reason to value living in a society where her fate depends (in part) on her own choices, even if the result is that she sometimes finds herself responsible for burdens that she could have avoided and has not consciously chosen. Critics argue that contractualists who cite the Value of Choice cannot justify intuitive principles in the Hazardous Waste case. The opportunity to choose is not valuable for Curious. On the contrary, that opportunity clearly makes her worse-off! Consider the following variant of the original case. Cautionary vs Covert. Officials have two options for dealing with hazardous waste. Under a Cautionary Policy, officials issue public warnings, erect barriers, and so on. Under a Covert Policy, officials remove the waste in secret, depriving the public of any knowledge of the risk. Suppose officials know that, while the Cautionary Policy will result in a larger number of lung damage cases, every afflicted person will be someone who heard the warnings and failed to heed them. By contrast, while the Covert Policy will result in a smaller number of lung damage cases, none of those people will have had any opportunity to avoid harm. Which policy should the officials choose? (Williams 2006, p. 253; Kumar 2015, p. 269) Intuitively, the officials should choose the Cautionary Policy instead of the Covert one, even though more people will suffer harm. Critics object that contractualists using the Value of Choice cannot capture this result. (Williams 2006). Consider Curious. The Covert Policy offers her greater protection from harm than the Cautionary Policy, because her chance of suffering harm is higher under the latter than under the former. And because she is impetuously curious, warnings and other information have negative value for Curious. The opportunity to choose only makes her worse-off. Therefore, Curious can reasonably reject the Cautionary Policy. Contractualists agree that the Cautionary Policy is “the only morally defensible choice” (Kumar 2015, p. 269). However, they argue that contractualism can deliver this result, for two reasons. First, even if the covert policy is instrumentally superior, all moral agents have strong symbolic reasons for “not wanting it to be permissible for public officials to hide important information because they decide that members of the public are not competent to assess it and respond appropriately” (Kumar 2015, p. 270). Covert paternalism clearly fails to treat people as responsible adults, and therefore everyone has reason to reject it. Second, Contractualists will appeal to the need to evaluate principles against generic standpoints, rather than against the eccentric preferences of particular individuals. “Our assessment cannot be based on the particular aims, preferences, and other characteristics of specific individuals. We must rely instead on commonly available information about what people have reason to want ... about generic reasons.” (Scanlon 1998, p. 203) What matters is not what Curious wants, but what a representative person in her situation would have reason to want. And people in general have reason to want control over their exposure to risk. Generic reasons also play a key role in contractualist accounts of risk (section 11) and our obligations to future people (section 13). 11. How does contractualism deal with risk? Moral philosophers often discuss artificial examples involving certainty. In particular, discussion of the ethics of harm focuses on cases where each action will definitely harm some particular person. But real-life ethics invariably involves widespread uncertainty. Most actual “harmful” activities are socially productive ones that impose some risk of harm on others. (Fried 2012a, 2012b) Can Contractualists provide a plausible and distinctive account of when and why such activities are permitted? (For more detailed discussion of a variety of Contractualist accounts of risk, see Frick 2015, Fried 2012a, Horton 2017, Kumar 2015.) We begin with a simple example: Driving: Bob lives in a large city in the developed world. His daily life is greatly enhanced by the fact that he and others are able to drive cars. Bob drives to work, drives out of town for the weekend, drives to the local shopping mall, enjoys goods and services that are only available because others can drive, and so on. One morning, while walking his dog along the street, Bob is killed in a traffic accident. The driver was not at fault – she was not speeding or drunk or otherwise irresponsible. Bob is just unlucky. In a large city where millions of people drive every day, faultless fatal accidents like this are bound to happen from time to time. Over the course of his life, Bob received many benefits from his and others’ driving. But suppose these are outweighed by the cost of his untimely death. As things turned out, Bob would have been better-off if driving had not been permitted. This seems to give Bob a reason to reject any principle that permits driving. And this reason seems to outweigh other people’s reasons to want driving to be permitted. (After all, any inconvenience they suffered would not be as bad as an early death.) It therefore seems that contractualism cannot permit driving. Indeed, contractualism must prohibit all socially useful activities that carry any risk of harm – on the grounds that, in a large population, over the course of a lifetime, any such activity is virtually certain to lead to at least one death. Utilitarians have an easy solution. Driving should be permitted if it maximises expected aggregate welfare. A small risk of death is outweighed by a large number of individual benefits. If Contractualism cannot permit any risky activities, then this places it at a distinct disadvantage against utilitarianism. One simple solution is to restrict the scope of contractualism. If contractualism deals only with cases where harm is certain, then it need not address risk at all. We could then combine a contractualist account of certain harm with a utilitarian account of risks of harm. Unfortunately, this solution has a high cost. Given the ubiquity of risk, and the comparative rarity of cases of certain harm, this pluralist option effectively sidelines contractualism. A second simple solution is to bite the bullet, and insist that risky social activities are never permitted. Few contractualists embrace this extreme revisionism. And it too threatens irrelevance. People will never abandon risk altogether, and we naturally turn to ethical theory to guide us through our risky activities. If contractualism is silent in this crucial area, then it loses any claim to be of practical relevance. The challenge for contractualism is to steer a middle-way between banning risk altogether and collapsing into utilitarianism. One central question is whether our contractualist evaluation of risk should be ex post or ex ante. Contractualism tells us to justify our moral principles to each person. A principle permitting driving must be justified to Bob. But when do we imagine this justification occurring? Suppose we were to offer Bob a choice between two principles: one permits driving and the other forbids it. When does Bob make this choice? Does he choose in advance – perhaps before he moves to the city or before his life begins? Or does he choose in retrospect – after he knows how his life has actually gone? In cases involving risk and uncertainty, these two temporal perspectives represent very different epistemological standpoints. Ex ante, Bob knows that living in a city where driving is permitted exposes him to a very small risk of death in a car accident where no one is at fault. Ex post, Bob knows that living in a city where driving is permitted has in fact resulted in his death. Some forms of contractualism explicitly favour ex ante rather than ex post evaluation. Rawls, for instance, asks his parties to choose principles to govern their society on the basis of general knowledge about how their lives might go, rather than particular information about their specific circumstances. Scanlonian contractualism, by contrast, usually requires justification to actual people who are aware of their own situation. In his 1998 book, Scanlon explicitly favours ex post justification. However, most contractualists (including Scanlon himself) now favour either ex ante contractualism or some hybrid view combining both ex ante and ex post evaluations. (Scanlon 2013, Kumar 2015, Frick 2015.) In our original Driving case, ex ante justification seems to deliver the intuitively correct result. When he views the prospects in advance, Bob may well conclude that the very small risk of death is outweighed – from his own perspective – by the large number of benefits he is almost certain to enjoy. If the imbalance is sufficiently great, we might conclude that it would not be reasonable for Bob to reject a principle that permits driving. (Some extremely risk-averse individuals will perhaps still object to driving, but contractualists can reply that this rejection is not reasonable.) Unfortunately, there are two problems with this contractualist response. First, if all citizens face the same pattern of risks and benefits, then this ex ante justification threatens to collapse into utilitarianism in practice. Contractualism thus risks losing its distinctiveness. Second, if citizens face different risk profiles, then even ex ante contractualism may still find itself unable to justify any risky behaviour. Consider a new example: Flying: Commercial air travel brings many benefits to many people. However, it also brings small risks of death. Some of this risk falls on people who benefit from air travel – notably passengers. But some people exposed to the same risks enjoy no benefits. Job is an Amish farmer who completely eschews all the ‘benefits’ of modern life. Job lives under the flightpath of air traffic between two major cities. (Job was not consulted about this flightpath.) One day, debris from a passing airplane falls on Job and kills him. (This example is adapted from Kumar 2015, which draws on Ashford 2003.) Job obviously has a strong ex post complaint against any principle permitting flying. But he also has an ex ante complaint. Even before he knows that he will be killed by falling debris, Job expects no benefit whatsoever from flying. (Indeed, he does not regard flying as truly beneficial to anyone!) Job will want to reject in advance any principle that imposes on him a risk of death without any compensating benefits. From a contractualist perspective, this rejection seems reasonable. The two challenges for ex ante contractualists are (a) to offer a principled justification for rejecting Job’s complaint; and (b) to ensure that that justification does not collapse into utilitarianism. One possibility is to argue that, like Curious, Job is too eccentric for contractualist purposes. We should be asking what people in general have reason to reject, rather than examining the strange predilections of singular individuals. However, unlike Curious’s counter-suggestible risk-seeking, Job’s rejection of modern life is considered and (prima facie) reasonable. If contractualism rejects Job’s considered worldview as “unreasonable”, then he might object that contractualism thereby fails to treat him with the respect due to a rational agent. A better alternative for the contractualist is to focus on broader principles that apply to all risky activities, rather than artificial principles relating only to flying. Job gains no benefit from air travel. But he, along with everyone else, does benefit from living in a society where everyone is free to pursue their own goals according to their own values. Job thus has reason to reject any principle that prevents people in general from pursuing reasonable lifestyle options, even if some of those options impose small risks of death on others. Another problem for ex ante contractualism is that, in some other possible cases, it is ex post evaluation that seems most appropriate. Contrast two scenarios introduced by Frances Kamm (Kamm 2007, p. 273; Fried 2012a, p. 47): Ambulance I: Should our city authorize its ambulances to speed on the way to the hospital whenever it is the case that doing so will save five sick passengers for every one pedestrian who is killed as a result of the speeding? Ambulance II: Should our city also prohibit its ambulance drivers from braking to save an identifiable pedestrian’s life whenever it is the case that the time lost by braking will cause the five passengers inside the ambulance to die? Many people judge that the first policy is permissible while the second is not. (Kamm 2007, Lenman 2008) This leads some contractualists to favour hybrid view that combine ex post and ex ante evaluation. (e.g., Lenman 2008) It is one thing to ask everyone to agree in advance to a policy that will predictably result in the deaths of some pedestrians, but another thing altogether to ask this particular pedestrian to lay down her life for the greater good! Unfortunately, critics of contractualism allege that hybrid views produce implausible results of their own in cases where the parties have asymmetric information about their fate. (Fried 2012a, pp. 53–54) Consider a final case introduced by Sophia Reibetanz (Reibetanz 1998): Unexploded Mines: One hundred workers are working in a field known to contain an unexploded mine. Another person, Z, is the only one who could disarm the mine. If Z disarms the mine, then Z is certain to get pneumonia. If Z doesn’t disarm the mine, then it is certain that 1 of the 100 workers will be seriously injured. This serious injury is ten times worse than suffering pneumonia. Z faces a certainty of (minor) harm, while each worker faces a 1% chance of (greater) harm. If Z is allowed to appeal to this information asymmetry, then Z’s complaint trumps the complaint of any individual worker. Z can thus reasonably reject any principle that requires Z to disarm the mine. But this seems counter-intuitive, as the certain result is a much greater harm for someone else. The challenge for hybrid contractualists is either to avoid this result or to explain why it is justified. (Ostuka 2011, Reibetanz 1998. For an argument that contractualism cannot solve this problem, see Fried 2012a, p. 54) 12. Can contractualism protect animals? Social contract theories notoriously leave out non-human animals. If all moral obligations are between parties to the social contract, then we have no obligations regarding animals who cannot be parties to the contract. So (for instance) torturing non-rational animals cannot be wrong. By contrast, utilitarians have no difficulty explaining why it is wrong to torture animals. This seems to place contractualism at a comparative disadvantage. Can contractualism provide an adequate account of our moral obligations to animals? Does it need to? Scanlon offers two solutions. The first is to limit the scope of his account. Contractualism is not an account of the whole of morality, but only an account of the morality of what we owe to other persons. This leaves open the possibility that our obligations to animals fall outside this part of morality. Scanlon also explicitly puts aside any moral obligations we might have in regard to the natural environment (Scanlon 1998, p. 179). Scanlon also suggests a possible way that obligations to animals could be accommodated within contractualism. This is via the notion of trustees, to whom justifications of proposed principles can be offered, on behalf of the animals they represent (Scanlon 1998, p. 183). Utilitarians will object that this second solution provides too indirect an account of what ultimately grounds our obligations to animals. The fact that it is wrong to inflict unnecessary pain on animals is not most plausibly explained via the notion of whether this behaviour could be justified to a trustee of the animals. Rather, it is wrong simply because of the suffering the animal feels. A utilitarian will add that, once we realise that this is what is wrong in the case of animal suffering, we should draw the same conclusion about human suffering. It is their capacity for suffering rather than their capacity for rational agency that plays the most salient role in explaining the wrongness of torturing humans. A contractualist can reply as follows. Contractualism captures the central sense of wrongness, one that plays a role in how individuals understand what they are accountable to one another for. The case of animals shows that this is not the only notion of wrongness. But, once we reflect on the differences between the two cases, we see why our obligations to one another are so different from any obligations we might have to animals—precisely because we cannot meaningfully justify ourselves to them. Animals are not a special problem for the contractualist, but rather an opportunity to explore what is distinctive about the contractualist approach. 13. Can contractualism protect future people? Another problem facing any social contract theory concerns our obligations to future people. It is hard to see how we can have any obligations to such people, as they cannot be parties to our contract. This is principally because of the absence of any possibility of mutually advantageous interaction between distant generations. The quality of life of future generations depends to a very large extent on the decisions of the present generation. By contrast, our quality of life is not affected at all by their decisions. We can do a great deal to (or for) posterity but posterity cannot do anything to (or for) us. This power imbalance is often characterised in terms of the absence of Hume’s ‘circumstances of justice’. (The phrase is borrowed from Rawls 1971, pp. 126–130.) For contractarians, for whom morality is an agreement for mutual advantage, it follows that we have no obligations to future people with whom we cannot interact. A similar problem arises for those like Rawls who seek to base the social contract on some modification of self-interested behaviour—such as self-interest behind the veil of ignorance. Contractualism, by contrast, easily avoids this particular problem, as it begins by assuming that moral agents are motivated by a desire to justify themselves to others. There is no reason why those others must be currently existing people. When deciding how to act, I can ask myself whether future people who are affected by my actions might reasonably reject a principle permitting those actions. For instance, if I want to construct a power plant that will leak radiation in the future, it makes perfect sense to ask whether those who will suffer as a result might reasonably object to my behaviour. Because it works with the possibility of reasonable rejection—rather than actual bargaining—contractualism can accommodate obligations to future people. This is a significant advantage over other social contract theories. However, there is a second problem regarding future people—one that does seem to apply to contractualism. This problem owes its prominence in recent philosophical debate to the work of Derek Parfit, to whom we owe the following example (Parfit 1984, pp. 351–379): The Summer or Winter Child. Mary is deciding when to have a child. She could have one in summer or in winter. Mary suffers from a rare condition which means that, if she has her child in winter, it will suffer serious ailments which will reduce the quality of its life. However, a child born in winter would still have a life worth living, and, if Mary decides to have a child in summer, then an altogether different child will be born. It is mildly inconvenient for Mary to have a child in summer. (Perhaps she doesn’t fancy being heavily pregnant during hot weather.) Therefore, she opts for a winter birth. Mary’s behaviour seems morally wrong. Utilitarians have a simple account of why Mary’s behaviour is wrong, as she brings about less human happiness than she could have done. Yet it seems that contractualism cannot capture this intuition. Consider a principle permitting Mary’s behaviour. If Mary’s behaviour is wrong, then this principle must be one that someone can reasonably reject. But who? Not the Winter Child—because he would otherwise never have existed at all. And not the Summer Child—because he doesn’t exist. Perhaps the most promising contractualist defence lies, once again, in the possibility that my grounds for rejecting a principle are not necessarily confined to its direct impact on my well-being. We might separate two moves the contractualist can make here. They might argue (1) that the grounds for rejecting a principle need not be its impact on my well-being; or (2) that it need not be its impact on my well-being. Intuitively, what is objectionable about Mary’s behaviour is not anything to do with well-being, or with the identity of future individuals. What is wrong is rather that Mary fails to show adequate respect for ‘her future child’—whoever that child may turn out to be. Even though there is no particular individual who can be said to have been harmed, there is still legitimate ground for a complaint that a principle permitting Mary’s behaviour shows inadequate respect to future people. The challenge for the Contractualist is to translate this complaint into one that can be made on behalf of the Winter Child. (For one recent attempt at such a translation, see Kumar 2003a, 2009. For a critique, see Parfit 2011, volume 2, p. 235) In chapter 22 of *On What Matters*, Parfit argues that the impersonalist restriction—which rules out appeals to the impersonal goodness or badness of outcomes—leaves any form of contractualism that incorporates the individualist restriction unable to respond to the non-identity problem. Instead, Parfit argues that contractualists should permit both personal and impartial reasons as grounds for reasonable rejection. Impartial reasons, here, are grounded in the moral claims or the well-being of individuals. “We have such impartial reasons to care about the well-being of every individual or person” (Parfit 2011, volume 2, p. 238). The crucial feature of impartial reasons is that they are not narrowly person-affecting. In a different people choice, we have an impartial reason to maximise the well-being of future people—even though different possible futures include different groups of possible people. “Since [because of the non-identity problem] we cannot appeal to the personal reasons that are had by people who never exist, we should appeal to the impartial reasons that are had by people who do exist” (Parfit 2011, volume 2, p. 240). As with the individualist restriction, we might wonder whether the admission of impartial reasons effectively abandons the spirit of contractualism. If every present person has the same impartial reasons, and if those reasons cannot outweigh any individual’s personal reasons, then the resulting more impartial formulation of contractualism will converge with rule consequentialism. But does this result tell us anything interesting about Scanlon’s contractualism? More generally, will the resulting theory retain the distinctive features of contractualism that appeal to those who are unsatisfied with familiar alternatives such as Kantian ethics or rule consequentialism? Debates about future people also connect to other recent controversies within contractualism, especially the literature on risk. The divide between ex post and ex ante justification is especially significant in non-identity cases, where ex post justification can be offered to particular individuals while ex ante justification can only deal with person types. Should contractualists give their person-affecting principles an ex post or ex ante interpretation? (Weinberg 2003 and 2015 defends an ex post interpretation, albeit within a Rawlsian framework rather than a Scanlonian one; while Parfit 2017 clearly sets out the ex ante alternative.) Another emerging debate is whether contractualism can deliver plausible verdicts in cases involving risks of human extinction. The prima facie burden for contractualism here is that, because the outcome where we fail to avoid imminent extinction contains no future people at all, there is no (particular or representative) future person who has the standing to reasonably reject principles instructing present people to ignore extinction risks and focus entirely on meeting present needs. (Finneron-Burns 2017, Frick 2017.)







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